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1 
A Perspective on 
the Michigan Law of Damages 
John W. Reed 
Generally 
To be most useful, this kind of introductory statement ought to 
have two characteristics. First, it should summarize general (and often 
familiar) principles. Second, it should take account of shifts and move-
ments and trends, not only to make recent cases more understandable 
but also to provide a basis for predictions. The truly professional 
lawyer does not seek to know merely what the law is; rather, he studies 
what the law has been, as well as what it is now, in order that his client 
may not be surprised by what the law becomes in the near and middle-
distant future, the time when the decisions that will be made by his 
client on his advice will be tested. 
And so I shall first offer a brief survey of the familiar aspects of the 
law of damages as it has been and as it is, and then move into the field 
of informed speculation about probable imminent developments in the 
law. 
In undertaking to provide an overview of damages principles, I 
labor under two handicaps. The first is personal. I am under the 
disadvantage of having little prior knowledge about the field. You may 
recall the old Danny Kaye movie in which Kaye, playing the part of an 
Austrian symphony conductor, turned to the audience to introduce 
the next piece on the program and said, in a heavy Viennese accent: 
"The composer of this symphony labored under a great handicap-
This chapter is a revision and extension of an article by Professor Reed, 
Trends in the Law of Damages, which appeared in 3 Litigation 8 (Fall 1976). 
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no talent." While I teach in the fields of evidence and civil procedure, 
where one would expect attention to be paid to damages problems, in 
fact the finer points of damages law are dealt with in such substantive 
law courses as torts and contracts. I may be wrong, but I have the 
impression that no major law school in the country today has a course 
called "Damages." Certainly I never was enrolled in such a course, 
nor have I ever taught one. 
Accordingly, I had to do considerable general reading to gain some 
idea of movement in the field. Although I characterize my lack of prior 
knowledge as a handicap, it may have been a blessing in disguise, 
because it enabled me to approach the subject in a journalistic fashion, 
which probably is the best way to provide an overview. 
The second handicap under which I labor appeared to me shortly 
after I began to do my preparatory reading. I discovered that I had 
been asked to deal with trends in a nonsubject. The subject of damages 
involves translating harm into dollars, but it is not really a coherent 
body of knowledge. It is a great exaggeration to refer to the "law of 
damages,'' because it is simply an amalgam of many concepts and rules 
having to do with fundamental policy questions about loss shifting, 
about risk spreading and about allocation of functions between judge 
and jury. Someone called damages "one of the minutiae making up the 
law of remedies." Some years ago Maurice Merrill, a former colleague 
of mine at the University of Oklahoma Law School, wrote a multi-
volume treatise on the law of notice, Merrill on Notice (1952). We can 
agree that there are countless ways in which the giving and receiving 
of notice arises, with rights and liabilities created and destroyed as a 
consequence; and there are general principles that can be identified; 
but it surely stretches our notions to think of notice as a major branch 
of the law. 
So also the subject of damages. There are some general principles, 
but damages is not a coherent body of law. It is small wonder that 
no one is writing books about it and that law schools do not provide 
courses in it. The standard, most widely cited text is McCormick on 
Damages, yet that book was published in 1935. There is no more 
recent book of consequence bearing that title. Professor Dan Dobbs's 
1973 volume entitled Remedies contains, as one part of the book, an 
excellent analysis of recent damages developments; but McCormick 
continues to be the benchmark. 
As a scholar put it, the law of damages "plods its way, ignored by 
academicians and 'accepted' by the courts .... The 'winds of change' 
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sweeping over other areas of law rarely stir the law of damages. There 
are a few ripples here and there, to be sure, but no one gets too 
excited." Sedler, The Collateral Source Rule and Personal Injury 
Damages, 58 Ky LJ 36 (1969). 
McCormick on Damages 
Before we tum to particular areas, let us survey the general prin-
ciples that appeared in Dean McCormick's useful book 40 years ago. 
In 1935 as now, there was great heterogeneity of view. First, as 
McCormick said, his book assembled these diverse views and simply 
gave the reader the array of expedients that should be considered in 
preparing and trying cases on the issue of amount. Second, he said that 
anyone who ventures on the task of covering the law of damages in a 
single brief volume must necessarily select for special emphasis certain 
aspects of the subject to the neglect of others. However, he identified 
four major problems dealt with by the law of damages. 
First, what elements of the party's loss, injury or grievance will be 
recognized as grounds of compensation? For example, in contract can 
one recover for disappointment due to the failure of the bargain? 
Second, what formula of measurement is to be used in fixing com-
pensation for the elements of loss that are recognized? For example, 
market value or value in use? Value at what time? In short, what 
formula? 
Third, what are the limits on the application of these formulas to 
the recognized elements? Thus emerge doctrines of certainty, con-
templation of the parties, foreseeability and the like. 
Fourth, what procedural rules regulate the ways counsel can plead 
and prove these things, and what procedural rules govern appellate 
courts in dealing with these issues? 
These four general questions continue to be the generic questions in 
damages and, in one way or another, underlie all the concerns we shall 
be considering. 
McCormick dealt first with compensatory damages and the princi-
pal problems they present. Most important of these was the rule of 
certainty, which he described as a standard requiring a reasonable 
degree of persuasiveness in the proof of the fact and of the amount 
of the damage. This rule, subject to a half dozen or more modifying 
doctrines, was designed to enable the trial judge to insist that the jury 
have factual data-something more than guesswork-to guide them in 
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fixing the award. (Through all of damage law there is a concern about 
guiding or limiting or supervising the jury in its evaluation of the money 
it will take to make the plaintiff whole.) It was another way of saying 
that damages could not be speculative or contingent. As of 1935 the 
certainty standard was applied primarily to cases involving the loss of 
commercial profits. 
Other problems arising in the attempts to award compensatory 
damages included such concerns as requiring the person harmed to 
use reasonable means to avoid or minimize or mitigate his damage, 
valuation problems (market value and the like), the concept of interest 
as damages, and the American rules regarding counsel fees and other 
expenses of litigation that could be assessed as costs. 
The balance of the old McCormick book-and therefore much the 
greater part of it-was divided according to substantive law areas. The 
section on torts, as you might expect, dealt primarily with rules gov-
erning proximate cause (material that might as well have been in a torts 
book), and it enunciated many particular rules like "the wrongdoer is 
liable for the consequences of negligent and unskillful treatment by the 
physician of the injured person, provided that he used reasonable care 
to select a reputable physician." McCormick, Damages 270 (1935). 
Other rules of that sort were included, all of them familiar to us now. 
That subject matter (torts), of course, is not one of the concerns of this 
volume. I mention it only by way of leading to the simple statement 
that exemplary or punitive damages were discussed by McCormick 
only in the torts section. (We shall see shortly that such damages are no 
longer so limited.) In McCormick's almost quaint language, punitive 
damages were said "to give outlet, in cases of outrageous conduct, to 
the indignation of the jurors, and they are defended as furnishing a 
needed deterrent to wrongdoing." McCormick, Damages 275 (1935). 
The contracts section of McCormick began with a discussion of the 
general standard of recoverable damages derived from our old friend 
Hadley v Baxendale, 9 Exch 341 (1854), which laid down the familiar 
rule that damages for breach of contract can be recovered for such 
losses as were reasonably foreseeable by the party to be charged 
when the contract was made. As of 1935, damages for breach of 
contract could not include compensation for mental distress, however 
foreseeable. There was, however, a crack in the door: mental distress 
damages were allowed in some cases involving breach of promise to 
marry, mistreatment of passengers by carriers and mistreatment of 
guests by hotels. 
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McCormick stated the familiar rule that liquidated damages consti-
tuting a good-faith estimate of the probable injury to be suffered are 
enforceable, but that a stated amount fixed merely as a deterrent, to 
prevent a breach, would not be enforced. 
Even as McCormick provided separate chapters dealing with spe-
cific torts, he provided chapters dealing with particular kinds of con-
tracts, such as employment contracts, construction agreements, sales 
of property, and the like. 
That, in a not very neat nutshell, is something of what the 1935 
hornbook was all about. I trust that it triggers your recollection of some 
of the main problems and that you get something of the flavor of the 
then-familiar black letter statements of rules and exceptions and splits 
of authority. There was not-I say this with all respect-very much 
grappling with the economic and social values that, after all, underlie 
and give rise to these rules. Awareness of those often competing values 
is indispensable to the lawyer who seeks not merely to know yester-
day's law and not merely to state today's law, but also to predict 
tomorrow's law, thereby serving his client more effectively and more 
responsibly. We must understand how these things fit, in the light of 
tensions concerning loss-shifting and risk-spreading and judge-jury 
allocation of functions. 
Damages Since McCormick 
What has happened since McCormick and 1935, and where are we 
headed? 
Certainty 
First, let us address ourselves to the so-called certainty rule. The 
rule for at least a century has been that a plaintiff is required to 
establish the amount of his damage with reasonable certainty. Stated 
conversely, a trier of fact may not speculate or conjecture, but must 
have some factual basis for fixing damages. This probably has not 
meant, and certainly does not now mean, that a plaintiff is without 
relief if he can prove that he has substantial damages but simply cannot 
establish the precise sums involved. Courts tend to say that mere 
uncertainty as to the amount will not prevent recovery if the evidence 
is of such certainty as the nature of the case permits. In short, the rule 
is one of "reasonable certainty" rather than "certainty." We do not 
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require proof with mathematical precision. As an English judge put it: 
"As much certainty and particularity must be insisted on ... as is 
reasonable, having regard to the circumstances and to the nature of 
the acts themselves by which the damage is done. To insist upon less 
would be to relax old and intelligible principles. To insist upon more 
would be the vainest pedantry." Ratcliffe v Evans, [1892] 2 QB 524, 
532-33 (CA). 
There is in the cases, however, a thread suggesting an irreducible 
minimum below which one may not go. In a Tenth Circuit case, 
plaintiff alleged that defendant had wasted gas on plaintiff's land by 
allowing it to escape into the air. Plaintiff proved that some gas had 
been allowed to escape but could not prove how much, except that 
there was evidence of pressure from which a maximum could be 
established. On this state of the record the court said there was no 
basis on which a jury could make a rational estimate of the wastage, 
and it affirmed the verdict for defendant. Shannon v Shaffer Oil & 
Refining Co, 51 F2d 878 (lOth Cir 1931). 
So, traditionally and now, generally and in Michigan, there is a 
rule requiring some certainty-not absolute, but reasonable under the 
circumstances-whatever certainty the case permits. What is sufficient 
certainty obviously cannot be resolved by specific rules. There is little 
doubt that a court judgment will vary not only between one time in 
history and another, but also between one kind of claim and another. 
Are we then left with no guide? Is there help in the more recent 
cases? Perhaps there is. From those cases one gets the impression that 
the more important it seems to vindicate a given claim, the more willing 
a court may be to accept incomplete evidence on the damages issue. 
Compare these two cases. The first is an antitrust case awarding lost 
profits to a theater owner who was unable to get first-run pictures, 
even though he could not show how much the profits would have been. 
Bigelow v RKO Radio Pictures, Inc, 327 US 251 (1946). But in a 
second case a federal district court denied loss of profits to a theater 
owner when a film distributor breached his contract to supply first-run 
rights to The Graduate, on the ground that the theater was new and had 
no profit record. Eastern Federal Corp v Avco-Embassy Pictures, Inc, 
326 F Supp 1280 (D Ga 1970); see generally Dobbs, Remedies § 3.3 
(1973). . 
The difference between the two cases probably is not a difference 
in the reasonable certainty of the profits. They were uncertain in both 
instances. Rather, the difference seems to be one in policy of the 
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substantive law: strong in the antitrust case but only moderate in the 
contract breach case. Therefore, weak proof is enough in the antitrust 
case and not enough in the contract case. 
Neither is there a distinction between tort and contract, because 
there are tort cases in which the court avoids a damage award, ostensi-
bly on the ground that the damages were not proved with adequate 
certainty, but in fact on the ground (if you read the case carefully) that 
the court doubted that the substantive liability extended as far as the 
plaintiff argued. 
So I repeat, one concludes from the cases that if the court really 
believes that a serious wrong has been done and that an important 
policy of law should be vindicated, it will accept vaguer proof, or less 
certain proof, of the quantum of damages than when there is no special 
pressure on the court to vindicate the plaintiff's interests. 
The certainty rule is most often applied to bar claims for loss of 
profits. In the older cases it tended to be an almost flat bar: no lost 
profits. It has even been applied in numerous instances when the proof 
was strong and approached certainty. Why this hostility? 
Perhaps the real explanation is that courts traditionally haye pre-
ferred to protect capital rather than income. We value property. Legal 
protection of property goes back into the dim mists of English legal 
history and beyond. A diminution in the value of property-a loss 
of something known-can in one way or another be recompensed in 
damages, but when we begin to talk about speculative profit, we find 
the courts less interested. Whatever willingness there has been to allow 
the recovery of lost profits has been most grudging. Any shift in this 
direction has been limited largely to recovery of profits for injuries to 
established businesses. There is a distinction in the cases between the 
new business and the established business, with no damages available 
for loss of profits for the business that has no earnings record. 
Michigan, which has pioneered in a number of areas but has lagged 
dismally in others, has recently jumped over the line here; there is 
now strong authority for recovery of lost profits from injury to a new 
business with no record of profits, in Fera v Village Plaza, Inc, 396 
Mich 639; 242 NW2d 372 (1976). 
Fera involved a failure of a shopping center landlord to make 
available space that had been leased to the plaintiff, who intended to 
open a "book and bottle" shop in the proposed shopping center-an 
interesting combination. Apparently one reads more happily in such 
a store. The shop had not yet opened, and therefore had no record of 
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profits, when plaintiff sued on a claim for anticipated lost profits. Yet 
the Michigan Supreme Court, with four justices joining in the majority 
opinion, two abstaining and one dissenting on this issue, held that 
the plaintiff could recover anticipated profits, and upheld a verdict of 
$200,000 for the lost profits. The proof was as thorough as possible 
under the circumstances. There were experts from the Michigan Li-
quor Control Commission, experts from the Cunningham Drug Store 
chain who conducted similar businesses in the vicinity, and experts 
who knew how· such stores operate in other locations. Between the 
defendant's and the plaintiff's witnesses, the opinions about the lost 
profits ranged from zero to $270,000. The jury brought in a verdict 
of $200,000, on which the trial court entered judgment. The court of 
appeals reversed, 52 Mich App 532; 218 NW2d 155 (1974), and the 
supreme court reversed and reinstated the trial court judgment on the 
verdict. The Michigan Supreme Court's great deference to what juries 
do prompted the court to say: "While we might have found plaintiff's 
proofs lacking had we been members of the jury, that is not the 
standard of review we employ." 396 Mich at 648; 242 NW2d at 376. 
TheFera case thus represents an unusual holding as compared with 
holdings in other states; it allows speculative future profits as damages 
for a business that never got started. A number of jurisdictions allow 
damages for future profits for established businesses, but almost none 
allow it for new businesses. 
Foreseeability 
In passing, I wish to mention one other general limitation on dam-
ages: foreseeability. I simply touch on it without discussing it at length, 
for two reasons. First, it serves primarily as a limitation on damages 
in negligence cases. It is not unknown in contract, but personal injury 
cases are its prime focus. Second, the foreseeability limitation is sub-
ject to the same analysis and is undergoing the same trend we dis-
cussed in connection with the certainty rule. That is to say, if a 
defendant's actions seem to violate a strong policy, the court will find 
foreseeable certain consequences that it would find not foreseeable in a 
case of less culpable or reprehensible activity. In some small part also, 
foreseeability and certainty are two sides of the same coin, and as one 
expands, so does the other. In law, if not in life, courts are requiring 
defendants to be more foresighted. Finally, there is always no-fault, 
which makes foresight irrelevant. 
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The Collateral Source Rule 
Any overview of the law of damages that purports to be concerned 
with movement and trends in the field must take account of the col-
lateral source rule. The collateral source rule has its primary appli-
cation in the personal injury field. Nevertheless, knowledge of what 
is happening to this aspect of the law of damages is helpful to an 
understanding of what is happening generally as the courts continue 
to adjust the allocation of losses and the shifting of risks between 
litigants. 
As you know, even though a plaintiff is compensated for his injuries 
by some source independent of the tortfeasor-by insurance, for ex-
ample-he is permitted to obtain full recovery from the tortfeasor 
himself. It matters not that this may give the plaintiff a double recovery 
or even a recovery for losses he never had at all. Illustrations are 
donated medical services, wage continuation plans, social security, 
workers compensation benefits and the like. Some courts do not apply 
the collateral source rule across the board, denying it when the col-
lateral payment is really a gift, but suggesting that if the plaintiff 
himself paid for those benefits, as with an insurance policy, then the 
defendant cannot have the benefit of them. 
The reasons most often advanced to justify the collateral source 
rule are three in number: (1) the plaintiff has in many instances paid 
for these benefits; (2) the donor intended to benefit the plaintiff; and 
(3) the wrongdoer should not get a windfall. The commentators nearly 
all agree that these are stated reasons but not real reasons and that 
the rule is retained for its value in financing personal injury litigation. 
The padding of a tort award with collateral source rule damages helps 
pay the contingent fee, just as pain and suffering damages do. The 
collateral source rule probably will not be abolished until there are 
new methods of financing litigation or until no-fault wipes out personal 
injury litigation. Meanwhile, however, the rule appears to be decreas-
ingly effective protection for plaintiffs, as defendants increasingly suc-
ceed in getting around it by adroitly suggesting other sources of succor. 
In addition, there are now some statutes reducing plaintiff's recovery 
by the amount of other benefits. 
The collateral source rule was formulated in a time when such 
sources were rare, when there was no health and accident insurance 
or workers compensation. At that time also, conduct had to be quite 
bad to be considered negligent. The tortfeasor usually was a rather 
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bad person, or at the least, a very careless one. In modem tort law, 
however, tortfeasors are by definition in the wrong, but are not always 
morally bad. Now, jurors likely will infer the existence of a collateral 
source-certainly will be receptive to the suggestion that it exists-and 
likely will also think that if the defendant is not ~ morally bad person, 
damages should be held down. As Harry Kalven wrote, "[The jury's] 
plaintiff sympathy does not extend to compensating the plaintiff for a 
loss which some other source has already made good." Kalven, The 
Jury, the Law, and the Personal Injury Damage Award, 19 Ohio StU 
158, 169 (1958). And the Seventh Circuit has said, "[T]he 'smell' of 
insurance or workmen's compensation must be presumed to affect a 
jury adversely to a plaintiff's cause." Mangan v Broderick & Bascom 
Rope Co, 351 F2d 24 (7th Cir 1965). 
Punitive Damages 
Most of the general rules about damages-the certainty and foresee-
ability rules, limitations on damages for psychological harm, rules 
concerning collateral sources, adjustments for inflation, interest and 
taxes, and limitations on amount, such as statutory ceilings, judicial 
control by means of additur and remittitur, and scheduling, as in 
workers compensation-have to do with the law's attempt to provide 
for damages that compensate the plaintiff, ·that make the plaintiff 
whole, that place the plaintiff as nearly as possible in the position 
he would have been in had the defendant's wrongful conduct not 
occurred. 
In fact, however, damages sometimes serve to do more than, or 
something different from, restoring plaintiff to his condition before the 
breach or injury or other harm occurred. An excellent illustration of 
this different use of damages is in the field of punitive damages. No 
portion of the law of damages is more in transition than that dealing 
with punitive damages. 
First, a brief word about the concept. As I noted, damages generally 
are thought to be compensatory and are designed to put the plaintiff 
in the status quo that obtained before the event occurred. We can do 
that, sometimes, with respect to dollars. We typically can do that with 
respect to certain kinds of property that can be repaired or replaced. 
But we cannot do that with respect to emotional harms, pain and 
mental suffering, and the like. In many instances it somehow seems 
that mere compensation is not enough. So the law occasionally applies 
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punitive damages not only to give vent, as McCormick said, to the 
outrage of the jury, not only to provide something by way of an offset 
to injury to so-called dignitary interests (as when someone spits in my 
face), but also typically as a deterrent, along with the criminal law 
sanctions, to keep people from doing that sort of thing again. 
Thus, four purposes for punitive damages are advanced: (1) there 
is a heavy element of deterrence; (2) there is some element of com-
pensation, probably to pay attorney fees; (3) there is some element of 
bounty, like the private attorney general doctrine, so that the possibil-
ity of punitive damages may encourage one to vindicate a right that he 
might otherwise abandon because there would not be enough dollar 
damages to make the action worthwhile; and (4) there is, some suggest, 
a vengeful or vindictive aspect to punitive damages. 
As for the amount of punitive damages, the theory has not changed 
much. Most jurisdictions do not require a fixed ratio between compen-
satory and punitive damages. The emphasis is on hurting the defen-
dant. McCormick spoke of exemplary damages as "smart money," 
designed to make the defendant hurt or smart. Obviously a thousand 
dollars may make one person smart yet be nothing to another who is a 
multimillionaire. So punitive damages have more to do with what it 
takes to hurt the defendant and to deter him than with what it takes to 
help the plaintiff. 
Obviously, therefore, the defendant's financial situation is impor-
tant. One reason for stating a claim for punitive damages, if there 
is any ground for it whatever, is to aid in discovery. If you have a 
claim for punitive damages, then in the pretrial discovery process you 
have a tactical weapon, due to the leverage it permits, with respect 
to discovery of defendant's financial position. Of course, punitive 
damages must be legitimate, or at least arguably legitimate, in the 
particular kind of case; but if plaintiff has any reason to state punitive 
damages, allegation and claim of them will permit discovery of defen-
dant's financial position. 
In what kind of case are punitive damages legitimate? Traditionally, 
punitive damages have been thought of as a tort remedy, there gener-
ally being no punitive damages in contract. The Michigan cases, few 
in number, are in accord. Caradonna v Thorious, 17 Mich App 41; 169 
NW2d 179 (1969); lsagholian v Carnegie Institute, 51 Mich App 220; 
214 NW2d 864 (1974). But even by the time of McCormick it was well 
settled that there were exceptions to the rule in contract. For example, 
a breach of contract to marry involving seduction could carry punitive 
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damages with it. A contract involving fraud could sometimes carry 
punitive damages, but that result was not especially remarkable be-
cause of the similarity to the tort of fraud or deceit, for which punitive 
damages were readily allowed. Finally, there were cases awarding 
punitive damages for an oppressive breach by a public utility, the 
idea being that the public utility had been given a favored position by 
the public and therefore a breach of duty owed to the public merited 
punishment. Thus, even 40 years ago there was a punitive damages 
possibility in a limited group of contract cases. 
More recently the courts have begun to give punitive damages 
for oppressive breaches of insurance contracts. You know of the 
multimillion-dollar recoveries in cases against insurance companies 
held to have resisted payment to beneficiaries unreasonably. I suggest 
that these cases, which seem so extreme, are not the end of the line. 
The courts are getting around the conceptual problems in several 
ways. In California, for example, the courts have been straightforward. 
They have said, in effect, that oppressive breaches of contracts are 
torts, and of course one can get punitive damages in torts. Other courts 
have taken an indirect approach and have redefined some existing tort, 
such as the intentional infliction of emotional distress, to make it apply 
to the insurance case. A third-and, to me, preferable-way is simply 
to declare that punitive damages are allowable for a sufficiently out-
rageous, unconscionable breach of contract. There are Florida and 
Indiana cases, and perhaps an Ohio case, on that. See cases collected 
in Note, The Expanding Availability of Punitive Damages in Contract 
Actions, 8 Ind L Rev 668, 677 et seq (1975). 
What is the thread in these cases? It is that in this age of consumer-
ism, if an oppressive breach is committed by someone with superior 
economic power (economic leverage), punitive damages may be as-
sessed. It is the ''big guy-little guy'' disparity of power. It is the utility 
cutting off services. It is the carrier breaching a contract for passage. 
It is the employer deliberately firing the employee in violation of the 
employment contract. It is the bank maliciously refusing to honor a 
check. Most recently it is the insurance company seeking to force an 
unfair settlement with a policyholder. 
I see no reason to assume that the illustrations will stop there. 
Indeed, there are two recent lndi~na cases suggesting that punitive 
damages may be available against an automobile dealer unreasonably 
refusing to honor a warranty in one case, Jerry Alderman Ford Sales, 
Inc v Bailey, 291 NE2d 92 (lnd App 1972), and against a real estate 
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developer who had sold houses around a golf course and then tried to 
force the buyers of the houses to buy the golf course, Standard Land 
Corp v Bogardus, 289 NE2d 803 (Ind App 1972) (reversing award of 
damages because inadequate proof of fraud). 
To repeat, when there is an oppressive breach of contract by a 
person in a superior position, punitive damages are likely to be al-
lowed; whether by defining the breach as a tort or simply by saying 
that it is a special kind of contract. They will not be awarded, I think, in 
contract cases where the parties are on reasonably equal footing. See 
Note, The Expanding Availability of Punitive Damages in Contract 
Actions, 8 Ind L Rev 668, 677-81 (1975); Galane, Proving Punitive 
Damages in Business Tort Litigation, 2 Litigation 24 (Spring 1976). 
Evidence in Damages Cases 
Whatever the technical rules governing recoverable damages in 
any kind of action, it is essential that counsel adequately communicate 
to the trier of fact the dollar value of those elements. Even the most 
liberal rule regarding certainty or foreseeability, or the like, means 
little if counsel does not persuade the fact finder. In the personal injury 
area, lawyers of great forensic talent have swayed juries with dramatic 
appeals. In the more prosaic kinds of cases, there is less room for 
poetry and emotion; but this does not mean that there is no need for 
clear, imaginative communication of the elements of damage. Despite 
all the criticisms of dramatists in the courtroom, the canons of ethics 
do not impose on the trial lawyer a professional obligation to be dull. 
It is not an overstatement to suggest that improvement in the quality 
of communication with jurors has had as much effect on the size of 
damages as have changes in the rules of substantive liability. 
The new Federal Rules of Evidence and the new Michigan Rules 
of Evidence make it easier for counsel on both sides to offer evidence 
relating to damages issues. 
For example, Article VII of the Federal Rules of Evidence, dealing 
with opinion testimony, relaxes and makes more informal the process 
of expert opinion evidence of the kind used in theFera case. No longer 
is it a valid objection that the expert opinion bears on the ultimate issue 
in the case. The expert need not state the factual basis of his opinion 
before giving it; and the opinion may be based on information not in 
evidence-indeed, not even admissible-if that information is of a kind 
ordinarily and reasonably relied on by experts in that field in forming 
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opinions or inferences on the subject. Moreover, the expert is allowed 
to testify "in the form of an opinion or otherwise," if his specialized 
knowledge will assist the trier of fact not only to determine a fact in 
issue but even "to understand the evidence." In other words, he can 
even be used as a "lecturer" to the jury (or court). 
I take these various relaxations to indicate that it will now become 
considerably easier to make use of the various specialists who have 
helpful views about such damages issues as loss of profits, the effects 
of inflation, actuarial calculations, market surveys, property apprais-
als, and the like. Any lawyer who tries damages issues is derelict 
if he does not study Article VII and the Supreme Court Advisory 
Committee Reports. 
Another, much more particular, liberalization appears in Federal 
Rule 803(18), making learned treatises admissible as substantive evi-
dence. Although the authority of the treatise must be established, it 
is relatively easy to employ as evidence, and trial counsel will find 
economy in using the well-written text of the distant, expensive expert 
on damage issues. 
A third, still narrower provision of potential utility is Rule 803(6), 
the business records exception to the hearsay rule. It provides that a 
business record (with the usual elements of regularity and routine) may 
be admitted not only to prove the traditional acts and events that are 
recorded but also "opinions, or diagnoses" contained in those routine 
records. Although the more obvious utility of that provision is in 
connection with the records of physicians and hospitals-in short, 
medical records-it may also be of use to counsel in some kinds of 
business and contract cases in which the records contain regularly 
entered opinions and conclusions as to causes and effects of various 
kinds of transactions and activities. 
The new Michigan Rules of Evidence are less liberal on these 
various points than the Federal Rules; but even they are helpful to the 
lawyer seeking more effective persuasion on the issue of damages. 
The Future of the Law of Damages 
It may be useful for me to conclude with some prophecies about 
what lies ahead in the damages field. 
First, I predict that the reasonable certainty rule will be relaxed, and 
there will be more protection of profits on any reasonable calculation 
or computation. Especially will this be true in cases of strong policy 
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support for liability. In other words, mathematical doubts will be 
resolved in favor of polcy concerns about conduct. 
My second prediction, being obvious, requires little courage. The 
courts will continue the centuries-old practice of fashioning remedies 
for invasions of interests that come into being as society and tech-
nology devise new mechanisms for living. For example, the creation 
of laws barring discrimination will be followed by judicial fashioning 
of damages remedies for violations of those laws. The common law, 
in other words, will continue to work. 
The third prediction is that the collateral source limitation will lose 
yet more of its vitality. Put another way, jurors increasingly will use 
collateral sources as a basis for reducing damages or, even, deciding 
not to award damages at all. 
Fourth, I believe there will be more scheduling of damage amounts 
as an element of the spreading concept of no-fault and as a restraint on 
jury generosity. 
Finally, I predict that in this age of consumerism there will be more 
punitive damages where the powerful are found to have oppressed the 
weak-where the big guy has oppressed the little guy. 
Despite the general perception, supported by the lack of major 
writing in the field, that the law of damages is relatively static, with 
nothing much happening, there is indeed considerable ferment and 
sense of change in the area. It is bound to make the trial lawyer 
nervous. You may recall the old Chinese curse: ''May you live in 
a time of transition." It may be a curse to live in a time of change; 
but it is exciting, and movement of the law in this field will provide 
challenges for you and opportunities for your clients. Put more direct-
ly, there will be more business for trial lawyers. 
